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Abstract
This essay examines a longstanding normative assumption in the historiography of
slavery in the Atlantic world: that enslaved Africans and their American-born de-
scendants were bought and sold as “commodities,” thereby “dehumanizing” them
and treating them as things rather than as persons. Such claims have, indeed,
helped historians conceptualize how New World slavery contributed to the ongoing
development of global finance capitalism—namely, that slaves represented capital
as well as labor. But the recurring paradigm of the “dehumanized” or “commodi-
fied” slave, I argue, obscures more than it reveals.
This article suggests that historians of slavery must reconsider the “commodifi-
cation” of enslaved humanity. In so doing, it offers three interrelated arguments:
first, that scholarship on slavery has not adequately or coherently defined the
precise mechanisms by which enslaved people were supposedly “commodified”;
second, that the normative position implied by the insistence that persons were
treated as things further mystifies or clouds our collective historical vision of en-
slavement; and third, that we should abandon a strictly Marxian conception of the
commodity—and its close relation to notions of “social death”—in favor of Igor
Kopytoff’s theory of the commodity-as-process. It puts forth in closing a reconsti-
tuted conceptualization of the slave relation wherein enslaved people are understood
as thoroughly human.
Book titles tell the story. The original subtitle for Uncle Tom’s Cabin was “The
Man Who Was a Thing.” In 1910 appeared a book by Mary White Ovington
called Half a Man. Over one hundred years after the appearance of the Stowe
book, The Man Who Cried I Am, by John A. Williams, was published. Quickskill
thought of all of the changes that would happen to make a “Thing” into an “I
Am.” Tons of paper. An Atlantic of blood. Repressed energy of anger that would
form enough sun to light a solar system. A burnt-out black hole. A cosmic slave
hole.
—Ishmael Reed, Flight to Canada (1976)
Between the modern master and the nonmodern slave, one must choose the
slave not because one should choose voluntary poverty or admit the superiority
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of suffering, not only because the slave is oppressed, not even because he works
(which, Marx said, made him less alienated than the master). One must choose
the slave also because he represents a higher-order cognition which perforce in-
cludes the master as a human, whereas the master’s cognition has to exclude the
slave except as a “thing.”
—Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy (1983)
The commodity might like to be human, but humanity, within the system of
capital, is ownership. . . . There are objects and there are owners. When there
are owners, one is either object or owner. Objects capable of ownership and ex-
change are commodities. One owns or does not own. The one that owns is an
owner and the one that does not own is either owned or lost. Of the lost,
nothing can be said. Of the owned, nothing need be said; they speak with the
voice of their owners, they speak of rights.
—Anthony Farley, “The Apogee of the Commodity” (2004)
Introduction
It has become something of a truism, or a conclusion taken for granted, in the
recent historiography of slavery that Africans and their descendants captured,
sold, and transported across great stretches of land and sea in the Atlantic slave
trade and the internal slave trades of the New World were reduced from complex
human subjects with extensive personal and collective histories to readily ex-
changeable objects—in simple terms, that these persons were made into things.
This compulsion on the part of historians and other writers often expresses itself
in terms of the “commodification” or “dehumanization” of enslaved people.1
According to this line of thought, enslaved humanity was compressed, flattened,
or erased as it came to be seen as a marketable good in Atlantic cycles of ex-
change. This logic also implies that the history of slavery, both across the Atlantic
and throughout the New World, contributed to the emergence and expansion of
global capitalism not only because slaves produced valuable cash crops for export
in the Americas but also because these slaves themselves were bought and sold as
goods in a market buttressed by financial speculation—in short, that they were
capital as well as labor.2
This essay aims first to question the historical claims and normative assumptions
according to which enslaved people were “commodified” as such and then to suggest
new ways to theorize the history of enslavement that do not make recourse to this
particularly unproductive cliché. It begins with the presumption that the question of
“commodified” humanity in the history of Atlantic slavery has not been adequately
examined or questioned. In surveying recent historical scholarship on both the
Atlantic slave trade and the internal slave trades of the Americas, I propose three in-
terrelated arguments: first, that scholars have not adequately or coherently defined
the precise mechanisms by which enslaved people were supposedly “commodified”;
second, that the normative position implied by this insistence that persons were
treated as things further mystifies or clouds our collective historical vision of enslave-
ment; and third, that future slavery scholarship should abandon a strictly Marxian
conception of the commodity—and its close relation to notions of “social death”—
in favor of Igor Kopytoff’s theory of the commodity-as-process. Finally, I offer a re-
constituted conceptualization of the slave relation—that is, the social dynamic
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between slaves and those holding power over them—wherein enslaved people are
perceived and treated as thoroughly human.
Person and Thing
One of the most common—and arguably most powerful—rhetorical strate-
gies used by numerous historians of modern racial slavery is to describe the “com-
modification” of enslaved people as unique to that particular moment in the
world-historical development of enslavement: what distinguishes Atlantic slavery
in the early modern and modern periods from all other slaveries modern, medie-
val, or ancient is precisely this “objectification” or “dehumanization” of the slave.
This device effectively conveys the supposed uniqueness of transatlantic slavery
and implies the urgency of its scholarly analysis. “Unlike any other system of com-
merce in world history, the primary commodities exchanged in the slave trade
were people,” writes Lisa Lindsay. “Shocking as this may seem today, most
Europeans involved in the slave trade conceived of Africans as physically compa-
rable to other trade goods. . . . Unlike sugar, salt, spices, and textiles—other com-
modities driving cross-cultural exchange in world history—slaves were human.”3
By marking an ethical gap between “most Europeans involved in the slave trade”
and contemporary historians and their readers, this passage frames racial slavery
and its market logic as jarring and strange—but it tells us little about slavery itself.
In such cases, the historical description of slavery and the moral condemnation
thereof occur in the same breath. In this sense, references to the “commodifica-
tion” or “dehumanization” of enslaved humanity are often normative claims mas-
querading as historical ones.
Consider, for example, the statement that “chattel slavery is the most
extreme example we have not only of domination and oppression but of human
attempts to dehumanize other people,” as embodied in the “unconscionable and
unsuccessful goal of bestializing (in the form of pets as well as beasts of burden) a
class of human beings.”4 Yet whether slave owners and slave traders were or were
not “successful” in their attempts to “bestialize” enslaved persons cannot possibly
stand as an historical claim. First, how could we know that the perpetrators of
slavery in any of its historical manifestations intended to “bestialize” or “dehu-
manize” enslaved people? Second, how might we proceed to describe and analyze
their intentions? And third, how could we discern whether an enslaved man or
woman or child had been successfully “dehumanized,” or whether that process
had been somehow (by the willpower of the slave?) halted? In such passages, his-
torical empiricism gives way to the supposed moral urgency of the scholar’s task.5
In some cases, this twist of rhetoric results in such convoluted statements as:
“Wherever and whenever masters, whether implicitly or explicitly, recognized the
independent will of their slaves, they acknowledged the humanity of their bond-
people. Extracting this admission was, in fact, a form of slave resistance, because
slaves thereby opposed the dehumanization inherent in their status.”6 This claim
contradicts itself by simultaneously attempting to account for both the “dehu-
manization” and the humanity of the slave, thereby twisting itself into an unwork-
able knot whereby the source of enslaved agency is actually located in the person
of the slaveholder. Such language is pervasive in the scholarship on slavery.7 In
fact, it has become commonplace to see slavery itself—as a historical phenome-
non—defined as the erasure of the slave’s personhood, both in law and in deed.8
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For some, our scholarly objective is to undo or reverse this state of things, so
to speak. Walter Johnson, in his well-known article, already gives us reason to ap-
proach such rhetorical posturing with extreme caution. One does well to heed his
warning that it is not the historian’s purpose to grant “agency” or “humanity” to
historical actors, least of all the enslaved. Writing history as either a political
mode of redress or as an “advertisement of goodwill” does not, after all, do justice
to the subject of study. “If we are to draw credibility by doing our work in the
name of the enslaved and then seek to discharge our debt to their history by [ac-
knowledging] the moral idiocy and contradictory philosophy of slaveholders,”
Johnson writes, “then I think that we must admit we are practicing therapy rather
than politics: we are using our work to make ourselves feel better and more righ-
teous rather than to make the world better or more righteous.”9
I echo Johnson’s claim, with the added caveat that extending the motif of
the completely “dehumanized,” “commodified,” “objectified,” or otherwise exis-
tentially flattened or socially de-complexified slave does little to articulate the
lived experience of enslavement. Rather, it recapitulates an all-encompassing,
static, and ahistorical view wherein the “commodified” slave is dominated abso-
lutely by the “commodifying” slaveholder—thereby reproducing a historical para-
digm according to which any social action or cultural expression on behalf of the
enslaved subject is perceived as always already “resistant” and as needing to be re-
covered by the enterprising (and morally astute) historian. The historiographical
preoccupation with the “commodification” of the slave produces the interpreta-
tive circumstances that have led many astray in just the manner Johnson laments.
It should be no surprise that historians of slavery, for decades now, have
found this rhetoric analytically enticing. What better way to condemn slavery
than to show how it made persons into things? But this particular vocabulary
derives from a precise context, and it is not historical inquiry; it derives, of course,
from Anglophone abolitionism.10 When we talk about “the full enjoyment of the
slave as a thing,”11 we are brandishing weapons borrowed from Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s toolbox—as in the original subtitle to her most famous work: “The Man
that Was a Thing.” This tendency to revive the (not unproblematic) politics of a
bygone era runs rampant in the historiography of slavery. Joseph Miller rightly di-
agnoses such rhetorical practices as “neo-abolitionist,” wherein “the rather stereo-
typed notion of slavery in both the academic literature and in modern popular
culture derives from a nineteenth-century abolitionist negative contrast—in fact
a politicized caricature—designed to stir the emotions of an emergently modern
world against all limitations of the personal liberties that it seemed to promise.”12
The binary opposition of person and thing that undergirds historical work on
slavery is a seemingly enthusiastic recycling of imagery perfected by the agents
and presses of Anglo-abolitionism that emphasized the “all-but-defining dyad of
slavery as an institution.”13 We should be wary of this habit for two primary
reasons. First, the “commodification” of the slave assumes an all-encompassing
master-slave dialectic that is arguably not an observable, historical phenomenon
but rather “a static abstraction, independent of time or place that we imagine by
observing it as such.”14 Second, it keeps us willfully ignorant of the lessons
learned from comparative studies of slavery in the Americas.15
Decades of historiography, starting with Frank Tannenbaum’s classic but
flawed study Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas (1946), have emphasized
the divergent legal and social practices that shaped colonial slave regimes in
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North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Although their methods of
inquiry have shifted—from an emphasis on inherited legal codes like the
Castilian Siete Partidas to an examination of slaves’ claims-making and legal activ-
ism—historians have reached the consensus (again and again) that strikingly dis-
tinct forms of enslavement, as institution and as process, were manifested in
disparate regions of the New World. As there is little room to elaborate on these
debates here, suffice it to say that enslaved people throughout Latin America and
the Caribbean, specifically in Iberian colonial contexts, were endowed to some
extent with formal and informal rights, duties, and obligations rarely observable
in North American or Anglo-imperial contexts.16
In addition, among the most profound disparities between slavery in North
America and in Iberian America was the role of Church and Inquisition institu-
tions, which represented a third relational axis mediating the dynamic between
slaveholders and slaves. And last, urban forms of slavery were also common and
sometimes as prevalent as the agricultural “plantation complex” in Mexico, Peru,
New Granada, Brazil, Cuba, and other regions of Latin America for large stretches
of time. To insist on the dyad of “dehumanizing” person and “commodified” thing is
to privilege a “neo-abolitionist” image of the antebellum United States as “the
single source of the politicized epistemology of studies of slavery as an institution.”17
Two Modes of “Commodification”
With that said, I propose to show exactly how arguments about the “com-
modification” of the slave break down. The description of the “commodification”
of enslaved persons usually takes on two aspects: the representational and the ma-
terial.18 The former refers to the way that perpetrators of slavery imagined or per-
ceived enslaved subjects, often in some abstract way (that is, at a distance). The
latter refers to the way that perpetrators of slavery treated enslaved subjects, often
in some corporeal way (that is, up close). The act of “commodification” could be
articulated differently across time and space.
In terms of the representational mode, the most commonly cited technique
of “commodification” was the notational apparatus brought about by the advent
of double-entry bookkeeping. “Spanish and Portuguese traders had called young
African males piezas or peças—pieces—as if they and their value as potential la-
borers could be counted like bolts of cloth,” writes Vincent Brown. “Women,
young children, and the old were designated as fractions of pieces. British slavers
numbered their captives outright, according to the sequential order in which they
were purchased.”19 When slaves are thus “called,” “counted,” “designated,” and
“numbered” in official commercial documents, Brown rightly notes, we witness
how slavers “flatten[ed] the social world [of slaves] by rendering it in the ab-
stract.”20 Stephanie Smallwood has also written in some depth about this prac-
tice. “Commodification is fundamentally a representational act,” she writes.
“Commodification’s power resides in language, in discursive forms (ledgers, bills
of sale) carefully crafted to define and imagine things in the terms that best facili-
tate their exchange and circulation.”21
If, as Smallwood claims, “Commodification is fundamentally a representation-
al act,” then we should consider the precise dynamics of this representation. Since
this notational “commodification” is really a question of historical sources, we
should further examine why certain historical circumstances gave rise to particular
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modes of representation and documentation—the paper trails that enable histori-
ans to write about slavery in the first place, even while acknowledging the analyti-
cal (and ethical) problems they may pose. First, the “discursive forms” responsible
for such representational “commodification”—double-entry account books, bills
of sale, etc.—are in many cases tied to specific imperial contexts. That is, specific
regimes of power produced particular kinds of documentation; the representation-
al genres described by Smallwood and Brown were indeed characteristic of slavery
in the Anglo-American Atlantic, but not necessarily in Iberian, Francophone, or
even African contexts. If we tie “commodifying” practices to the production of
particular modes of documentation, then it is increasingly difficult to argue that
slavery itself was definitionally the “commodification” of enslaved humanity.
Could it be argued that slave-trading under the auspices of the British Empire was
more “commodifying” than in other imperial contexts due to its particular mode
of record-keeping? How might we describe the representation of enslaved people
by other “discursive forms”—say, perhaps, the diaries of Moravian missionaries in
the West Indies?22
It is worthwhile, moreover, to assess whether such notational representation
was unique to slavery and slaves (and therefore essential to its perpetration). Ian
Baucom’s discussion of the 1781 Zong massacre and the concurrent burgeoning
of global finance capitalism should complicate the image of this seemingly
violent representational act.23 Baucom deftly shows how the financial revolution
of the eighteenth century and its culture of speculation were accompanied by, or
rather enabled by, a significant “epistemological revolution.” “The credit financ-
ing that both accompanied the slave trade and, in partnership with the trade,
fueled an Atlantic cycle of accumulation entailed more than a revolution in
accounting procedures. It demanded an epistemological revolution [that] trans-
formed the epistemological by fantasizing it, altered the knowable by indexing it
to the imaginable,” Baucom writes. “If the epistemological was transformed so
too were the ontological and phenomenological convictions of society revolu-
tionized as both the thingly and the perceptible quality of things found them-
selves fictionalized but credited as no less real for their increasingly theoretical
existence.”24
What Baucom suggests here is that enslaved people were not unique in their
“fictionalized” representation. This transformation from the “knowable” to the
“imaginable” describes an Atlantic world of credit and insurance that enables
complex transactions to take place in the absence of material goods—an Atlantic
world that enables the captain of the Zong to throw 133 slaves one-by-one over-
board off the coast of Jamaica in order to redeem the insurance claim to his cargo,
his captives. The imaginative properties of this Atlantic world were bolstered by
certain “historicist” practices that emphasized the “type” and the “typical” as
sources of knowledge. The paradigm of this practice was double-entry bookkeep-
ing, the very technique that signaled a “revolution in accounting.” And while
Brown and Smallwood quite fairly note the violence of representing or equating
humanity with numeracy, it is critical yet to place this supposed violence within
the “epistemological revolution” that Baucom describes.
His account includes excerpts from the meeting minutes of the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty from the month of July 1783 that indicate how
the Commissioners “spent the majority of their time calibrating a fine and exact
scale of recompense for those far-flung workmen of the empire whose bodies had
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been wounded in the service of the crown.”25 So, for example, there are several
entries like this one:
To Thomas Sutton, clerk in the storekeeper’s office in Jamaica, who lost his
sight by a “violent inflammation” in January 1782: 40 pounds.
To Captain John Thomas, who had received “many dangerous wounds,” includ-
ing “one through his lungs, one through his bladder, and now has seven balls
lodged in his body which cannot be extracted”: 150 pounds a year and half pay.26
This section of the minute book is analogous to the “commodifying” numeracy of
a slave trader’s account books. The two share “the imperturbable search for an
alternate, alinguistic grammar of commensurability, the casual pursuit of a financi-
alizing, decorporealizing logic of equivalence.”27 As Baucom argues, this minute
book is haunted by “something the Admiralty would decidedly not have wished
to associate with its loyal, suffering, subjects: the specter of slavery, the slave
auction block, the slave trader’s ledger book; the specter, quite precisely, of
another wounded, suffering human body incessantly attended by an equal sign
and a monetary equivalent.”28 The historical advent of this epistemology of the
imaginable and the typical—epitomized by the “theoretical realism” of double-
entry bookkeeping and its “commodifying” logic of representation—indicates
how the allegedly “dehumanizing” notational practices of Anglo-American slave
merchants might be better understood as part of a larger global shift in the repre-
sentation of reality according to a speculative culture of finance capital.
This is not to say that Smallwood and Brown are incorrect in asserting that
slavers’ representations of enslaved people as abstracted “numbers” or “pieces” was
objectifying. It was that, but it was also much more than that. And due to the larger
historical circumstances that enabled it, it also tells us little about either perpetra-
tors of slavery or their victims. The shortcomings of this approach are further dem-
onstrated by the second, material group of “commodifying” practices—those that
were not representational or theoretical at all, but rather embodied in the mundane
interactions of slaves and those who held power over them (owners, traders, specu-
lators). My claim is this: Within the material, mundane, and corporeal processes of
enslavement—that is, how slavers treated slaves—the supposed practices, theories,
or logics of “commodification” inevitably break down because the enslaved subject
is always perceived as human through and through.
Smallwood’s assertion that commodification is primarily a “representational
act” may be profoundly ironic; she elaborates a theory of “commodification” in
her groundbreaking Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American
Diaspora (2007) that largely forgoes this representational mode for one in which
“commodification” is primarily achieved through violence enacted upon the body
of the slave. These forms of “psychic and social” violence constituted a science of
human deprivation that “relied on a scientific empiricism always seeking to find
the limits of human capacity for suffering,” Smallwood writes. The process of
“commodification” involved “probing the limits up to which it is possible to disci-
pline the body without extinguishing the life within.”29 Smallwood is quite right
in describing the transatlantic slave trade as thoroughly dependent upon captives’
suffering. What seems less clear in her account is how this science of suffering sig-
nifies the alleged phenomenon of “commodification.” On the contrary, it strikes
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me that the Middle Passage and its techniques of brutalization were profoundly in-
vested in human frailty. The slave trade did not operate by treating slaves simply as
things—objects, commodities, goods—it operated by treating them as persons who
could suffer, and it worked to maximize that suffering without hitting the tipping
point at which the slave ceases to suffer because it has died.
Smallwood adds that slavers’ brutalization of captive Africans “revealed the
boundaries of the middle ground between life and death where human commodi-
fication was possible.”30 This “middle ground” was created by forcing captives
into “unmitigated poverty,” by starving them and holding them in iron chains, by
segregating enchained slaves according to sex. In so doing, slavers “reduced
people to the sum of their biological parts, thereby scaling life down to an arith-
metical equation and finding the lowest common denominator.”31 Perhaps most
crucially, the “commodification” of the slave also entailed the severing of social
and communal ties. “Commodification” was an “alienating agenda.”32
Smallwood’s analysis of these supposed techniques of “commodification” is
thus deeply indebted to Orlando Patterson’s concept of social death: “slavery is the
permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.”33
Smallwood finds her “middle ground” in this condition—a legally or socially
liminal state between initial enslavement and ultimate manumission and an onto-
logically liminal state between being and nonbeing: physical life without social
life, belonging to no social community yet provisionally incorporated within a
larger social order. Smallwood’s account is striking in how it maps techniques of
“commodification” directly onto Patterson’s articulation of “social death.” The
slave’s ontologically liminal space is precisely where “human commodification
was possible,” where the slave is “reduced” to “currency” by severed social ties,
violent domination, and general maltreatment.
Vincent Brown has rightly noted how strict adherence to Patterson’s theory
of social death can cause serious interpretive problems in the study of slavery. “It
is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s
breathtaking survey,” Brown writes, “a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to
describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a
least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-
type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.”34 The flaw in Smallwood’s account is
that she allows “the condition of social death to stand for the experience of life in
slavery.”35 Hence, Smallwood’s (and others’) description of the thoroughly “de-
humanized” or “commodified” slave is largely ahistorical; it maps itself directly
onto a sociological abstraction, leaving no room for historical contingency or
local variation. It presumes the outcome of “commodification” and describes all
aspects of enslavement as constituting or producing that outcome.
Indeed, the question that looms over all this analysis is: What aspects of
Atlantic slavery, if any, might not have contributed to human “commodification?”
If we suppose that captives were bought and sold along the west coast of Africa but
that they were reasonably well fed, would these captives still be “commodified?” If
slaves were not segregated by sex aboard slave ships, would they still be “commodi-
fied?” What if captives were kept in prisons, but not held in chains—would that
make a difference? Analyses of the transatlantic slave trade like that above confuse
historical contingency with theoretical fact. If anything, Smallwood’s emphasis on
the biological aspect of “commodification” undermines the very concept itself.
Smallwood writes that, “Because human beings were treated as inanimate objects,
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the number of bodies stowed aboard a ship was limited only by the physical dimen-
sions and configuration of those bodies.”36 This assertion that “human beings were
treated as inanimate objects” contradicts the earlier statement that slave traders
“reduced people to the sum of their biological parts.” How can something be both
biological and inanimate?
And more, when Smallwood claims that slave merchants were “probing the
limits up to which it is possible to discipline the body without extinguishing the
life within,” she is also revealing slavers’ recognition of the continued physical
vitality and biological life of the slave. Patterson himself states this outright:
“A dead slave, or one incapacitated by brutalization, was a useless slave.”37 In de-
fining the power relation internal to slavery, Patterson further observes that
“Perhaps the most distinctive attribute of the slave’s powerlessness was that it
always originated . . . as a substitute for death, usually violent death.”38 And this
is because slaves can die.39
I contend that even the horrific practices of starvation, torture, and other
forms of “psychic and social” violence enacted upon slaves reveal a profound in-
vestment in and acknowledgement of the humanity of enslaved people by their
enslavers. I use the word “investment” intentionally and ironically to argue that
perpetrators of slavery, rather than treating slaves simply as inanimate things, mar-
ketable products, or exchangeable commodities—as things—understood them as
thoroughly human. “Scientific” efforts to starve African captives rely on the pre-
sumption that captives can be starved. To violently subject captives to “unmitigat-
ed poverty” and deprive them of their social and familial ties is to make the
fundamental concession that enslaved Africans could be violently subjected to
poverty, that they could be deprived of social and familial ties. One cannot alienate a
cowrie shell or starve a bale of cotton. This social fact is most evident when we
venture beyond the representational mode of “commodification” and into the
realm of everyday human contact.
The exact terms in which Patterson defines “social death” confirm this
much: If the slave is violently dominated, natally alienated, and generally dishon-
ored, then we must recognize that only a human can be so dominated, so alienated,
and so dishonored. As Patterson writes, “The counterpart of the master’s sense of
honor is the slave’s experience of its loss. The so-called servile personality is
merely the outward expression of this loss of honor.”40 This “experience . . . of
loss” implies the loss of something that was once there. In sum, Smallwood’s stunning
account of the Middle Passage—surely the best we have in the literature on
slavery—would be enriched by redirecting analytical attention to how this partic-
ular historical process hinged upon, rather than depleted, the humanity and vul-
nerability of its victims.
A Better Model: Commodity-as-Process
Historians of slavery striving to demonstrate the “commodification” of en-
slaved people have been led astray by strict adherence not only to Patterson’s
“social death” but also to Marx’s theory of the commodity. In his discussion of the
United States’ internal slave trade and the sexual abuse of enslaved women,
Edward Baptist constructs a theory of commodification that marries Marx’s com-
modity fetishism with Freud’s sexual fetishism. This theoretical framework is
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troubling from the start, if only because Marx’s formulation of the commodity and
commodity fetishism is arguably inapplicable here.
According to Marx, “This Fetishism of commodities has its origin . . . in the
peculiar social character of the labour that produces them.”41 And when Marx
mentions “labour,” we should assume that he does not mean the reproductive
sort. Indeed, Marx’s entire conception of the commodity as social use-value is
grounded in the dynamic between human labor on one side and human want on
the other. The commodity as social use-value is determined by the quantity of
human labor embodied within it, representing the labor-time socially necessary
for its production. Commodities are “only definite masses of congealed labour-
time.”42 Marx’s articulation of commodity fetishism is thus not particularly suited
to the perception or treatment of enslaved people.
Baptist’s ensuing examination of the “commodification” of enslaved
people—regarding the slave sale or auction, and the rape of enslaved women—
demonstrates the instability of this rhetoric. In the first case, Baptist describes the
“deanimation of enslaved people” as “virtually inanimate articles”43 and their sub-
sequent “reanimation” as a “lifeless commodity”44 when they are made to pose, flex
their muscles, dance, and play instruments or card games in slave pens where
traders meticulously examined their bodies. Slaves were made “to demonstrate their
salability by outwardly performing their supposed emotional insensibility and physi-
cal vitality,”45 as Walter Johnson writes of Louisiana slave markets. Baptist does
not, however, see the apparent contradiction here—that slavers were invested in,
dependent upon, the fundamentally human liveliness of their captives. Slaves were
not just “reanimated” as “market myths”46 but as flesh capable of withstanding
immense suffering.
More central to Baptist’s amalgam of commodity and sexual fetishism is the
frequent rape of enslaved women by slave traders. Several conclusions emerge
from his discussion of the slave market and sexual abuse: first, that enslaved
women were regarded by their traders as “impassioned”47 objects; second, that
traders used these objects to satisfy their sexual desires, to assert their masculinity,
to “erase dependence” and “forget fears”48 by exerting control over them; and
third, that this capacity for sexual objectification was bought and sold in the slave
markets of the United States. I maintain, on the contrary, that such historical in-
stances of rape and sexual abuse do not signify the objectification of enslaved
women. It seems rather that slave traders took pleasure in the inability of their
“fancy maids” to express sexual consent.
This powerlessness on the part of women who were not “people whose opin-
ions must be considered” suggests that these women had opinions that were disre-
garded, that they had control or power over their lives and bodies that was
suppressed. To take such pleasure in the displeasure, the lack of consent, the pow-
erlessness of another is—perhaps counterintuitively—to recognize the humanity
of that person. Baptist’s brilliant analysis of slave trader correspondences, specifi-
cally showing how their coded language of sexual conquest represented enslaved
women as “commodities,” is less convincing in the material (and nonrepresenta-
tional) realm of everyday intimacy. Slavers were always deeply invested in slaves’
necessarily human—“frail, sentient, resistant”49—capacity for suffering.50
Such analytical inconsistencies are caused not only by the reductive “neo-
abolitionist” ways we think about slavery but also by the rigid application of inad-
equate theoretical models. Simply put, Marx’s conception of the commodity does
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not work in such studies, perhaps because its static quality does not sufficiently
describe a historical experience that is thoroughly processual. As a possible
remedy, I suggest that historians of slavery adopt Igor Kopytoff’s theory of the
commodity-as-process. This model is best suited to our field of inquiry because it
reflects the lived experience of enslavement itself. We first must acknowledge that
“slavery” refers to a vast and nebulous web of associations and histories. Modern
racial slavery, as a world-historical phenomenon, had many moving parts. From
the coasts of Africa, to the Atlantic Middle Passage, to the shores of the New
World, to the plantations and cities of the Americas, back and forth throughout
the internal slave routes—the life of a single slave often comprised an accumulat-
ed series of various forms of enslavement. Any one of these stages might vary
greatly.
As Walter Johnson writes, the “daily process of the slave trade” involved
“Many slaves trades, many versions of what was happening [that] met and were
contested in every sale.”51 In order best to understand how “slavery” varied so
widely across time and space—how slaves often passed between different modes of
enslavement—we must embrace an appropriately flexible and contingent theoret-
ical model. I would suggest further that the very word “slavery” itself is meaning-
less insofar as it attempts to describe abstractly what was historically a set of
changing, disparate, and transitional circumstances and experiences.52 That is,
enslavement was always profoundly processual in nature—but not just in the
sense of bondage and freedom, life and death, being and nonbeing. It was so with
respect to itself, with respect to the mundane life of the slave, with respect to the
multiple slaveries endured by any single man or woman throughout a lifetime.
Kopytoff acknowledges this precisely: “What we see in the career of a slave is
a process of initial withdrawal from a given original social setting, his or her com-
moditization, followed by increased singularization (or decommoditization) in the
new setting, with the possibility of later recommoditization.”53 This approach
enables us to envision the slave not as a static, “commodified” entity but rather as
a social figure that moves through various phases of expulsion, marginality, and
reincorporation. Kopytoff’s formulation is also particularly useful for re-examining
the contexts of Smallwood’s and Baptist’s work, respectively—the slave market
(whether on the Gold Coast or in the American South) and the plantation.
Commodity-as-process suggests that “The only time when a commodity status of a
thing is beyond question is the moment of actual exchange.”54 Beyond the singu-
lar, ephemeral moment of purchase, the enslaved subject is then “decommodi-
tized” in a process Kopytoff calls “singularization,” though often (if not always)
able to be “recommoditized.” As such, the enslaved person in whatever context
becomes a “potential commodity,” endowed with “an exchange value even if they
have been effectively withdrawn from their exchange sphere and deactivated, so
to speak, as commodities.”55 In the parlance of our historiography, this is the
chattel principle; Kopytoff helps us understand how the plantation laborer, for
example, is not definitionally a “commodified” individual but rather a “potential
commodity.”56
Commodity-as-process skirts the theoretical and historical pitfalls of the
so-called “commodification” of enslaved humanity in four ways. First, it produc-
tively revises a strictly Marxian conception of the commodity-fetish.57 Second,
the observation that the commodity only truly exists in the “moment of actual
exchange” enables us to realize that torture, starvation, and rape—the total
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brutalization of the slave—is predicated on the presumed humanity of the victim.
Third, it provides a manner of speaking about the “commoditization” of enslaved
people without resorting to the normative impulses found in the historiographical
opposition between person and thing. And finally, it is thoroughly historical.
Miller urges that the global history of enslavement be rethought as a “historical
process.”58 Slaving, he writes, was a strategy, not a sociological abstraction or
simply an “institution.” And he reminds us that the study of enslavement should
focus explicitly on humans and humans acting in order to go “beyond the passivity
of suffering and domination.”59
Kopytoff’s theory of the commodity-as-process offers a suitable vocabulary and
theoretical toolkit to meet such an occasion. We might consider, for example, how
such framing might have enhanced Smallwood’s account of the successive processes
of “turning African captives into Atlantic commodities” and “turning Atlantic com-
modities into American slaves,” where instead of the sociological flattening of
“social death” we had the dynamism of Kopytoff’s description of the multi-phased
career of the slave. We might also consider how, from this perspective, the slave
auction in Baptist’s analysis might render the slave “commoditized” yet not necessar-
ily “lifeless,” positioned interstitially such that the commodity status of the slave can
be reactivated, deactivated, or potentialized without becoming permanent, defini-
tional, or ontological. Commodity-as-process thus enables us to imagine historical
enslavement in new ways that do not make recourse to such static and normative
paradigms buttressed by “social death,” Marxian commodity fetish, or any other
inadequate theoretical position.
Reparative Semantics?
That we might come to understand enslavement as thoroughly processual has
been highlighted by recent scholarship describing the so-called “second slavery.”
This work maintains that there was a fundamental transformation in the scalar,
geographical, and technological aspects of slavery in the nineteenth century that
made it both specifically modern and capitalistic. Atlantic slavery was thus recon-
figured by the production of new staple commodities (especially cotton) in un-
precedented quantities, the sweeping migration of enslaved people as well as
slaveholders to regions previously marginal to the Atlantic economy (the Deep
South, western Cuba, the interior of Jamaica, and south-central Brazil, among
others), the incorporation of biological and technological innovations for har-
vesting crops, and a newfound reliance on often excessive financial speculation.60
The “second slavery” importantly “calls attention to the continual re-formation
of slavery”61 and demonstrates conclusively, if somewhat ambiguously, the mutual
historical embeddedness of racial slavery and the advent of global capitalism. Indeed,
the relevant question for historians of slavery is no longer whether slavery was capital-
istic—as it may have been for previous generations of scholars who emphasized the
premodern, feudalistic, and paternalist aspects of American slavery—but precisely
how and why (and when) slavery and capitalism converged so forcefully.
Yet there are still analytical hurdles to overcome in parsing the relation
between slavery and capitalism. As John J. Clegg observes, one central problem
running throughout this new scholarship is the refusal to define capitalism itself.
While several scholars have given names to the phenomena they describe—
Walter Johnson’s “slave-racial capitalism” and Sven Beckert’s “war capitalism”
Journal of Social History 201612
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 3, 2016
http://jsh.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
come immediately to mind—Clegg notes that “by dodging the problem of defini-
tion altogether they fail to provide a coherent account of capitalist slavery.”62
Another unresolved tension in this body of work is the conjunction of historical
process and transformation with a critical vocabulary, as described above, that is in-
sufficiently dynamic. Resorting to the concept of enslaved “commodification” in
order to highlight the “dehumanizing” features of a highly profitable and finan-
cially sophisticated system of production based on unfree labor—in short, that
this new kind of slavery “was tightly linked to the intensity and profits of industri-
al capitalism”63—belies the profound rupture at the heart of the “second slavery.”
If we can speak of the “commodified” slave in both seventeenth-century
Africa and nineteenth-century Mississippi, then it becomes increasingly difficult
to argue that “the second slavery defines a distinct period of Atlantic history.”64
Moreover, the repeated emphasis on the increasingly strict and, in many cases,
tortuous work regimes that compelled enslaved people to produce cotton and
sugar in unprecedented quantities at an unprecedented rate in the nineteenth
century reveals again slaveholders’ profound investment in the laboring, suffering
body of the slave. This burgeoning research on mass slavery and its capitalistic
aspects would be strengthened by increased attention to how such historical trans-
formations—clearly resonant with a Kopytoffian vocabulary—did not signal the
erosion of enslaved peoples’ humanity but rather were built upon it.
In addition, this newfound emphasis on slave exploitation and the onset of
modern industrial capitalism has resuscitated debates about the language of
history. Recent writing has urged the substitution of the phrase “enslaved person”
for the word “slave.” One article suggests we opt for “enslaved person” because
such historical subjects were “humans first, commodities second,” thereby “restor-
ing identity, reversing a cascade of institutional denials and obliterations.”
“Slave,” on the other hand, is allegedly a “nonhuman noun.”65 This argument is
not new. Deborah Gray White writes in the preface to the revised edition of her
seminal study Ar’n’t I a Woman?: Female Slaves in the Plantation South (1999) that
were she to rewrite her book, she would opt for “enslaved” rather than “slave”:
“The noun ‘slave’ suggests a state of mind and being that is absolute and unmedi-
ated by an enslaver. ‘Enslaved’ says more about what happened to black people
without unwittingly describing the sum total of who they were.”66 This same rhe-
toric was later echoed by Daina Ramey Berry, who writes that, “I prefer to use the
term ‘enslaved’ rather than ‘slave’ because it forces us to consider that bondpeople
did not let anyone ‘own’ them. They were enslaved against their will.”67
More recently, such semantic choices have been championed by Baptist—
who opts for “enslavers” rather than “slaveowner” or “slavemaster”68—and Gregory
O’Malley, who writes in his Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of British
America, 1619–1807 (2014) that “the historian [has] little to work with in the
quest for more humanizing descriptors. To avoid endless repetition of the commodi-
fied term slave, I will often refer to those carried in the slave trade as Africans or
simply as people.”69 As above, somehow the word “slave” has become “nonhuman”
and “commodified,” thereby implying an ontological status of nonbeing thrust
upon captive Africans against their will. The repeated idiom of enslaved “commod-
ification” has thus sneakily embedded itself into the language of scholarly inquiry.
The implied conclusion of such lexical uneasiness is that these historical
persons were not actually slaves at all: “Enslavers” mistook their captives for “slaves,”
whose nonextinguishable humanity made the “inhuman” project impossible simply
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by means of their continued existence. But are there really such damned connota-
tions to the word “slave,” which surely does not describe an ontological status at all
(unless one forces it to), and is there such emancipatory potential in the phrase “en-
slaved person?”70 These efforts at developing a new glossary for the study of slavery
seem not just convoluted and self-gratifying but also profoundly ahistorical. They
demonstrate how a mere semantic quip becomes the basis for normative posturing
and a shallow attempt at reparative historiography. The way to a more lucid account
of the history of enslavement is not by investing analytical or explanatory weight in
synonyms, it is by being more precise about what we talk about when we talk about
slavery.
The language of historical inquiry is, however, essential to our understanding of
the past. “Much of the scholarly work on slavery,” Jennifer Morgan writes, “is,
indeed, a search for metaphor.”71 Importantly and perhaps unfortunately, metaphors
have become central to establishing ethical distance between scholars and their sub-
jects of study. Describing the two central modes of “commodification,” the represen-
tational and the material, frequently hinges upon a single word. It pervades writing
on the subject: slaves were “regarded as”72 or “seen as”73 or “treated as”74 or “recom-
posed as” commodities;75 slaves were “treated as” inanimate objects;76 slaves were
“designated as” pieces;77 slaves were “reanimated as” market myths;78 slaves were
“masquerading as” human beings;79 slaves were “exhibited . . . as” desirable posses-
sions;80 slaves were “treated simply as ‘capital’” [emphases added].81 This repeated
phrasal structure reappears like a motif; its power is to suggest that slaves were not
truly commodities, inanimate objects, pieces, myths. Although they were not truly
these things, they were perceived, imagined, or treated as such. Scholars thus force an
ontological and epistemological rift between themselves and the perpetrators of
slavery who supposedly thought and did such things. Another way of putting this is
that enslavers wrongly perceived persons as things. Since people are not and cannot
truly be commodities, the proposition that any person could become or be trans-
formed82 into a commodity should thus be morally repugnant.
From this perspective, to state that slaveholders were capable of this unthink-
ability is to suggest an ethical detachment from us: they thought possible what we
know is impossible and unthinkable. To force this historical and moral fracture is,
in a way, to misunderstand and to refuse to understand—perhaps to be unable to
understand—historical actors who took part in the world-historical processes of
enslavement. Miller warns us of the trappings of such rhetoric, that “unless we
make the effort to step far enough outside of our own lives to at least comprehend
what all those slavers, and those whom they enslaved, were all about, we end up
lamely lamenting the fates of the enslaved, or condemning the slavers as congeni-
tally evil.”83
These moral gaps between past and present—upheld by the opposition
between person and thing in the study of slavery—are rooted in moral outrage and
produce epistemological deficiencies. In this sense, we might consider an alterna-
tive notion of the “unthinkable,” in the sense that enslavement is difficult to think
about within the inherited intellectual framework of Western political economy
and political thought.84 Many of the questions raised in this essay—Can a person be
a thing?—are extremely difficult to parse perhaps mainly because they insist on
maintaining an ethical chasm between the historian and the historical subject.
Thus, the presumed “commodification” of enslaved humanity obscures more than it
reveals. It renders our collective historical vision of enslavement increasingly hazy
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and opaque. Rather than resort to common metaphors that foreground overwhelm-
ing normative assumptions and ahistorical abstractions, I propose that we repatriate
the human to the core of the slave relation, thereby understanding enslavement not
as a binary opposition between person and thing but rather as a set of competing
claims made for and against, by and through historical persons in concrete social
situations.85
Conclusion
Perhaps surprisingly, Patterson deserves the last word:
Thus there is, we are told, a fundamental problem posed by slavery, the so-called
conflict between the treatment of the slave as a thing and as a human being. The
formula ends with some ringing piece of liberal rhetoric to the effect that human
dignity is irrepressible: ‘You may define a person as a thing,’ goes the flourish,
‘but you cannot treat him as one’ (or some such pious statement). The whole
formula is, of course, a piece of irrelevance.86
I may be guilty of such a “flourish,” but presumably for good reason. My aim is not
to regurgitate any “ringing piece of liberal rhetoric” but to emphasize how uphold-
ing the opposition between person and thing in the study of slavery forges moral
and epistemological gaps between the past and present that cannot be overcome.
Put otherwise, one wishes that historians of slavery had heeded Patterson’s
warning: The tendencies described in this essay that have characterized slavery
scholarship condemn to the realm of pure abstraction, and thereby recklessly
obscure, the material, embodied, and mundane processes of enslavement in the
modern era. It is by embracing a contingent and processual framework like that
proposed by Kopytoff that we might avoid this deplorable result and approach a
history of modern enslavement that is yet more heinous and less unthinkable.
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